TWICE AS FAR

SWISSAIR 111

CRASH INVESTIGATION

- EVALUATING THE EVIDENCE -

HOW FAR DOES IT GO?

THE MI6 - RICHARD TOMLINSON CONNECTION

TOMLINSON

I have doubts about any theory that comes from undisclosed experts.

However, regardless of the validity of these articles,

and his possible connection to the crash,

a criminal investigation would have pointed fingers in the direction of the British MI6.

That perhaps was sufficient grounds for pressure to be applied

to ensure the outcome indicated a wiring accident.

Had we known the backgrounds of the other passengers,

there might have been other directions in which to look

and from which pressure was secretly applied.

That is why passenger profiling is so important,

yet it was not done in this investigation.

Why not?

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AW

SIEVERTS' LAW

The air surrounding a liquid is absorbed by that liquid

in proportion to the air pressure and the temperature of the liquid.

The molten copper of each short-circuited bead

was extremely hot

and the air pressure was nearly normal

(equal to Banff, Alberta).

So there was a great affinity for the bead to absorb the air that surrounded it.

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ANDERSON THEORY

ANDERSON THEORY

Dr. Anderson relied on Sieverts' law for his theory.

However, the problem with fires is that the wire may melt more than once

due to either a second short-circuit,

or simply due to intense heat from the fire.

While these facts may play havoc with the Anderson Theory

that tries to put a timeline on the melting event,

re-melts don't take anything away from Sieverts' Law.

Each time the wire melts,

molecules from the atmosphere surrounding the wire

will be absorbed.

Their presence will be a record of their existence

in the air surrounding the wire bead

at the instant of the last melting event.

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TURNOVER OF AES REPORTS

TURNOVER OF AES REPORTS

TO THE RCMP

FRASER'S NOTES OF PHONE CALL WITH GERDEN

RECEIPT OF TWO AES REPORTS

This memo indicates that the official turnover

of the first two AES reports

to the RCMP by the TSB

occurred on 2001 MAY 03.

The signature at the bottom belongs to Lee Fraser.

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RCMP/TSB AES MEETING

RCMP/TSB AES MEETING

2001 MAY 03

GORMAN'S NOTES

 This one page appears to be the only notes

that Gorman made for a two and one-half hour meeting,

YAMASHITA'S NOTES

Yamashita has a Ph.D.,

but not of geology.

He had already informed me in September of 1999

that he knew nothing of AES,

or of incendiary devices and fires.

Also,

he worked closely with both Gorman and Fraser.

So he can hardly be called

independent or impartial.

What's more,

they tend to mix the Anderson Theory in with Sieverts' Law.

BALLANTYNE'S NOTES

FOR THE MEETING OF 2001 MAY 03

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RCMP FORENSIC CRIME LAB

RCMP FORENSIC CRIME LAB

AES REPORT EVALUATION

2001 MAY 12

GORMAN'S REQUEST

Considering this should have become

a criminal investigation of a multiple homicide,

and what today would be called

an act of terrorism,

Gorman seems to merely ask

instead of telling the Crime Lab

that the reports have to be

verified or refuted.

However,

the RCMP's Crime Lab was the wrong place to seek such an action.

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nELSON's COMMENTS

NELSON'S COMMENTS

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BALLANTYNE'S COMMENTS

Dennis was beginning a discussion with his subordinates

about what should be done with the two AES reports.

Ballantyne appears to have the correct approach to the matter.

However, Wendy Norman's handwritten comment

'perhaps one on the opposite side of the fence'

is completely inappropriate for a person in her position.

It reflects the same attutide that I had encountered

from Norman during September of 1999.

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BALLANTYNE'S NOTES

BALLANTYNE'S NOTES

EVALUATING THE REPORTS

The dates for these notes are mid-February, 2002.

That's nine months from first receipt of the request.

Note Sidla's connection to the third report.

This third report was the forced false report

demanded by the TSB's senior member.

Also note the date for Ballantyne's first and second call to Sidla.

It would seem that Sidla didn't know about the third AES report

until the second phone call on 2002 FEB 12.

Lee Fraser already knew about it on 2002 JAN 20

as noted in the following two memos.

While he may indicate one 'draft copy',

remember he has already signed for two reports.

This would indicate that he already knew a third report was about to be released.

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FRASER'S REQUEST FOR FINAL AES REPORT

FRASER'S REQUEST FOR FINAL AES REPORT

2002 JAN 20

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TURNOVER OF 3RD AES REPORT

TURNOVER OF 3RD AES REPORT

2002 FEB 25

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TRANSFER OF DOCUMENTS

TRANSFER OF DOCUMENTS

GORMAN TO STOTHART

2002 JAN 14

Everyone seems to have taken their time

to do what should have been very high priority work.

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RESULTS OF CRIME LAB REVIEW

RESULTS OF CRIME LAB REVIEW

AES DRAFT REPORTS 1 & 2

2002 FEB 12

So much for the review by the RCMP's 'Scientific Team'

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CRIME LAB REVIEW FORWARDED TO FILE

Gorman indicated that as of the 6th of March, 2002,

or the writing of this memo,

the final AES report had not been received

by the RCMP.

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TURNOVER OF FINAL AES REPORT

TURNOVER OF FINAL AES REPORT

TSB MEMO TO RCMP

2002 FEB 25

Notice the date on this memo from the TSB - February 25, 2002.

The memo clearly indicates an attached copy of the final AES report.

The stamp shows 2002 March 06

It took nearly two weeks for the memo to come across Ottawa.

The TSB used overnight FedEx Courier

for everything during the investigation.

Why would this report take so long?

It seems that  Gorman's previous memo went out the door

just as this package arrived from the TSB.

The question might now be asked,

why go to the bother of involving these RCMP members

if the plan was to do nothing about the AES results?

First, each already knew of the AES results because I had already contacted them,

and Gorman knew of that contact effort back in October of 1999.

So these people were not new to the matter

and had already expressed their disapproval of the value of the test results.

Then, Fraser and Lathem knew

I had already submitted a grievaance and promotion complaint.

In case the question was ever asked in the future,

they could point to this effort as an attempt to scientifically examine the AES problem.

After all, that is exactly what they did in 2011 when responding to the CBC's program.

But examine all of this closely.

It amounted to a meeting of five RCMP members that lasted several hours,

and then a few minutes for each to write their sparse notes.

Ballantyne then took months to go over the reference material,

(if he ever actually did!)

and then a few minutes to write a concluding report.

Not much effort was expended to investigate

the potential murder of

229 people.

What's more,

is it not strange that Ballantyne's final report was written

just as Dr. Brown's final report was received by the TSB?

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GORMAN/STOTHART EMAIL

GORMAN / STOTHART EMAIL

2001 AUG 01

This is Stothart's request for the AES reports

and Gorman's response.

Stothart had been involved in the file from the start,

and had been responsible for filing and correlating all documents.

However, he seems to have known nothing about the AES process with Dr. Brown.

So much for being a key member of the RCMP's 'Investigative Team.'

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GORMAN/STOTHART EMAIL

GORMAN / STOTHART MEMO WITH FINAL AES REPORT

The final AES report was sent to Halifax

with this memo dated

2002 MAY 21.

Stothart might not have seen it,

as it might simply have been placed on the file

by Lathem or his secretary.

However, it makes little difference.

The report was the result of

intimidation and corrupt actions

by senior members of the TSB and the RCMP.

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DID THE LINE LEAK

DID THE LINE LEAK

OXYGEN LINE LEAK

GORMAN'S REPORT

2002 JAN 14

This is Gorman's account of his discussion with John Garstang

about the oxygen line leak,

as mentioned in the book.

This was put forward to RCMP management

as a possible reason for all the excessive burning.

However, it would have required excessive burning

to melt the end cap,

thus allowing the oxygen to escape.

What's more,

this had nothing to do with the start of the fire.

The leak would have provided

only a minimal amount of oxygen

to the atmosphere in the cockpit area,

and it would have been consumed

in the fire located in the immediate area.

Gorman was putting forward a 'red herring'

designed to placate anyone questioning the amount of burn damage.

This is a copy of a portion of my final report on the

Cockpit Oxygen Line Endcap.

It was submitted

to Supt. MacLaughlan

soon after I left the hangar.

These photos were taken during the Zurich trips to specifically show the oxygen line above the rear wall of the cockpit.  The pilots would have utilized their oxygen masks during the fire as part of their standard operating procedures. 

This photo, at its centre, shows the oxygen line with the 'T' joint and the blue coloured aluminium end cap.  This image was taken during the third Zurich trip after some of the blanket removal had started .  The main inner insulation blanket has been removed to expose the line, while the smaller blankets next to the aircraft's skin are still present.  The two green objects from the top to the bottom of the photo are frame structures.

This scaled photo shows the length of tubing from the 'T' joint to the blue aluminium endcap.  The scale is in centimetres.

A close-up view of the aluminium endcap.  Again, the scale is in centimetres.  The oxygen tank, when full, holds about 80 cubic feet of oxygen when at normal pressure.  So in a fire of this magnitude, a leak of the line would only have had a very localized influence, and it would not have had an effect elsewhere.

This photo shows what was left of the oxygen tank.  Due to the amount and manner of destruction, it was impossible to determine how much oxygen it had contained at the moment of impact.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

FROM THE COMMISSIONER

Once the CBC's 'Untold Story' aired,

it was time to go back to the Commissioner of the RCMP

to see what they now intended to do about the matter.

The new PIO (Professional Integrity Officer), Joseph Hineke

responded for Commissioner Elliot with this memo.

Shortly after, Commissioner Paulson took over the Force.

There then was a media blitz stating that there would be a new management style.

The word 'transparency'

along with all the other catch phrases used by those in high places

to try to impress and fool the public

were thrown about frequently by the RCMP in many media releases.

So another memo was sent off to Ottawa,

only to be answered with the attached memo from

Chief Superintendent Craig MacMillan,

the acting PIO.

The fact that it arrived by registered mail

was taken as a warning to back off with the direct approach.

Note that in both letters,

each writer states that he is responding on behalf of the Commissioner of the RCMP.

While a mere technicality,

for legal purposes it shows that the views expressed

represented those of the Commissioner.

This letter made me realize

that the complete truth could only be made public in one manner.

This letter was the last straw,

the final reason for the book and this web site.

TWICE AS FAR

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