TWICE AS FAR
SWISSAIR 111
CRASH INVESTIGATION
- EXTRACT FROM FILE NOTES -
FOR
- 1999 JAN 09 -
AES DATA TABLES
The following tables of figures are a selection of AES data readouts for debris wire short-circuits.
They show high readings of magnesium with no aluminium, iron, or zinc.
Dr. Brown explained this by stating that smoke is a physical mixture of the various materials being consumed.
Moreover, the air current at the time was likely directional.
Alternatively, the bead itself may have been somewhat protected by other wires.
Indeed, if the readings were identical at all points,
one might wonder about the legitimacy of the findings.
For those who forget their chemistry symbols, the following is supplied:
Symbol |
Element |
Al |
Aluminium |
C |
Carbon |
Ca |
Calcium |
Cl |
Chlorine |
Cu |
Copper |
F |
Fluorine |
Fe |
Iron |
K |
Potassium |
Mg |
Magnesium |
Mn |
Manganese |
N |
Nitrogen |
Ni |
Nickel |
O |
Oxygen |
P |
Phosphorus |
Pb |
Lead |
S |
Sulphur |
Sn |
Tin |
Zn |
Zinc |
The exhibit numbers are listed in the last table below to provide the known details of the wire.
Keep in mind that each bead is the short-circuited area of an aircraft debris wire.
Some wires are original aircraft cables, and others are from the IFE (In Flight Entertainment) power feed wires.
For the AES tables,
the symbols across the top are the elements.
On the left is the depth in Angstrom units.
Less than 100A is considered the environmental cap
and it is not considered indicative of the wire bead's environment at the time of its formation.
Each horizontal line contains the percentage of the element heading that column.
The sum of the horizontal line should be 100.
What had caught the interest of Dr. Brown and others is the readings of Mg, Al, Fe, and Zn.
The explanation was offered by some that the magnesium (Mg) came from the aluminium alloy structure of the plane
as it has as much as 4 percent magnesium in the alloy.
However, it can be seen that magnesium in many instances far surpasses the percentage of aluminium,
sometimes by eight times or more just in this first table.
In one table, magnesium is sixteen percent with no aluminium at all.
It was put forward that due to cracks and fissures in the copper bead,
seawater contaminated the wire interiors.
However, two things refute that theory.
First,
seawater contains an abundance of elements,
many of which are not present in these tables.
If seawater had been the source,
AES would have found them,
and they would be listed with their percentage of the total number of molecules present.
Second,
test wires were created by short-circuiting the identical type of aircraft wires
and they were then submerged in sea water for thirty days.
Not one of those wires showed the inclusion of
magnesium, iron, aluminium, zinc, or any other element
that should not have been in the bead.
It was also put forward that there must have been an onboard source for the questioned elements.
Samples of everything available were either provided to Dr. Brown for analysis,
or were tested by various labs to determine their elemental composition.
Nothing contained the elements in question,
and the aircraft's structure could not account for the range of percentages of aluminium and magnesium
that were collected in the AES examinations of the wire beads.
After all this testing,
Dr. Brown provided a source and an explanation.
However, neither the TSB nor RCMP management would hear of it
as the TSB does not conduct criminal investigations
and the RCMP did not wish to take on the file as a multiple homicide investigation.
This file was not to be anything else but a safety investigation.
(From Exh #1-3790)
Point Scan Results - Site #1, Spot #1a CANMET - 00 JAN 11
DEPTH |
Cu1 |
C1 |
O1 |
N1 |
Fe2 |
S1 |
Al2 |
Mg2 |
Zn1 |
Sn1 |
Cl1 |
Ca1 |
P1 |
Pre-etch |
13.7 |
68.7 |
8.4 |
4.6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3.7 |
0.9 |
0 |
50A |
32.9 |
40.2 |
11.9 |
3.4 |
0 |
0.7 |
0 |
6.6 |
0 |
0 |
2.1 |
1.4 |
0.8 |
100A |
36.1 |
37.3 |
11.3 |
2.8 |
0 |
0.8 |
0 |
8.8 |
0 |
0 |
1.4 |
1.6 |
0 |
300A |
47.1 |
20.5 |
12.7 |
2.2 |
0 |
0.9 |
0 |
13.6 |
0 |
0 |
0.9 |
2.1 |
0 |
500A |
54.8 |
9.8 |
14.6 |
1.1 |
0 |
0.8 |
0 |
16.2 |
0 |
0 |
0.8 |
1.8 |
0 |
800A |
63.2 |
4.7 |
18.0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12.0 |
0 |
0 |
0.8 |
1.3 |
0 |
1000A |
68.6 |
2.8 |
17.7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9.4 |
0 |
0 |
0.8 |
0.7 |
0 |
1500A |
74.0 |
2.6 |
16.8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5.2 |
0 |
0 |
0.8 |
0.5 |
0 |
2000A |
84.7 |
2.2 |
12.5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.5 |
0 |
0 |
3000A |
94.0 |
3.0 |
3.0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Exh #1-12652
(From Exhibit 1-3790)
Point Scan Results - Site #2, Spot #1b CANMET - 00 JAN 12
DEPTH |
Cu1 |
C1 |
O1 |
N1 |
Fe2 |
S1 |
Al2 |
Mg2 |
Zn1 |
Sn1 |
Cl1 |
Ca1 |
P1 |
Pre-etch |
19.7 |
58.6 |
10.8 |
2.0 |
0 |
1.0 |
0 |
6.8 |
0 |
0 |
0.6 |
0.5 |
0 |
3000A |
84.0 |
6.1 |
9.9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Point Scan Results - Site #1, Spot #1a CANMET - 00 JAN 12
DEPTH |
Cu1 |
C1 |
O1 |
N1 |
Fe2 |
S1 |
Al2 |
Mg2 |
Zn1 |
Sn1 |
Cl1 |
Ca1 |
P1 |
Pre-etch |
5.1 |
84.9 |
4.7 |
1.3 |
0 |
0.5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1.3 |
2.1 |
0 |
50A |
12.9 |
69.1 |
8.8 |
1.9 |
0 |
1.6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3.6 |
2.1 |
0 |
100A |
15.8 |
64.8 |
10.0 |
1.6 |
0 |
2.1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2.7 |
2.9 |
0 |
200A |
19.4 |
52.9 |
11.5 |
1.5 |
0 |
2.3 |
0 |
7.1 |
0 |
0 |
2.2 |
3.1 |
0 |
500A |
29.8 |
31.5 |
15.5 |
1.7 |
0 |
2.8 |
0 |
13.9 |
0 |
0 |
1.5 |
3.3 |
0 |
1000A |
36.7 |
18.0 |
19.8 |
1.8 |
0 |
2.4 |
0 |
17.1 |
0 |
0 |
1.0 |
3.1 |
0 |
1500A |
43.8 |
11.3 |
20.9 |
1.5 |
0 |
1.8 |
0 |
17.4 |
0 |
0 |
0.6 |
2.7 |
0 |
2000A |
50.5 |
8.2 |
21.3 |
0 |
0 |
1.6 |
0 |
15.5 |
0 |
0 |
0.5 |
2.2 |
0 |
2500A |
57.6 |
7.4 |
20.5 |
0 |
0 |
1.4 |
0 |
10.7 |
0 |
0 |
0.5 |
1.8 |
0 |
3000A |
60.0 |
6.6 |
18.9 |
0 |
0 |
1.2 |
0 |
11.1 |
0 |
0 |
0.5 |
1.5 |
0 |
4000A |
85.2 |
3.1 |
11.6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
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